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ABSTRACT
The collapse of stock prices have a huge negative impact on
financial markets and the real economy, the mechanism and pre-
vention methods of stock market crashes have become the focus
of academic attention. This article takes Chinese A-share listed
companies from 2008 to 2016 as samples and investigates the
impact of M&A goodwill on the risk of stock price crashes. The
study finds that, compared with non-goodwill companies, compa-
nies with goodwill have a greater risk of future stock price
crashes; with the increase of goodwill value (GW), the risk of
future stock price crashes increases significantly. Further research
shows that the GW affects the risk of stock price crashes through
information asymmetry at the corporate and market levels. This
article not only deepens the research on the factors influencing
the risk of stock price crashes, but also has great significance in
understanding the role of M&A goodwill in the capital market
and how to prevent stock price crashes and promote the orderly
development of the capital market.
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As an important way to integrate capital market resources, M&A plays a significant
role in improving the efficiency of capital allocation, rapidly expanding the scale of
enterprises and enhancing competitiveness. With the rapid increase of mergers and
acquisitions in recent years, goodwill value (GW), as an accompanying product of
mergers and acquisitions, has blowout growth. The total net GW of A-share listed
companies expanded from 37.613 billion RMB in 2007 to 1445.7 billion RMB in
2018. Merger and acquisition of goodwill has become the focus of capital market
attention. Although goodwill can bring excess profits to enterprises, due to the opa-
city of M&A information disclosure and the deviation of goodwill measurement
methods in A-share listed enterprises, the real value of goodwill disclosed by many
enterprises has not been reflected, and the problem of the sharp rise and fall of stock
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prices caused by M&A has gradually become prominent. In theory, the collapse of
stock prices has attracted much attention because it cannot be explained by the trad-
itional efficient market theory.
Some scholars have analysed the influencing factors of stock price collapse risk
from the perspective of management behaviour. Xu Nianxing et al. (2012) studied the
herding behaviour of institutional investors, Li Bilian (2016) studied pledge of major
shareholders, Kim et al. (2011) analysed equity incentive. Others examine earnings
quality, such as Yang Mianzhi and Liu Yang (2016), Ye Kangtao et al. (2015) analysed
disclosure of internal control information by analysing accounting information qual-
ity. However, few scholars have paid attention to the impact of M&A goodwill on
stock price crashes. Only Wang Wenjiao et al. (2017) and Yang Wei et al. (2018)
have studied the relationship between goodwill and stock price collapse from the per-
spective of accounting conservatism and stock price bubbles. The effects of informa-
tion asymmetry and investor overreaction on goodwill and stock price crash are still
not discussed.
This article investigates the impact of M&A goodwill on the risk of stock price
crash by taking A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2016 as samples. The results
show that: (1) Compared with non-goodwill companies, the goodwill companies can
significantly increase the risk of future stock price crash; (2) The GW is positively
correlated with the risk of future stock price crash; (3) Further research shows that
the multiplier of goodwill and information opacity is positively correlated with the
risk of stock price crash, which indicates that the information asymmetry hypothesis
has an effective effect on the impact of M&A goodwill on the risk of stock price
crash; and (4) The multiplier of goodwill and negative media reports is negatively
correlated with the risk of stock price crash, which indicates that the information
asymmetry hypothesis effectively acts on the impact of M&A goodwill on the risk of
stock price crash. The main contributions of this article are as follows: Firstly, the
existing research on the risk of stock price crash has not paid enough attention to
merger goodwill. This article examines the relationship between goodwill and stock
price crash risk, enriching the research in this field. Secondly, unlike the previous lit-
erature which focuses on one of the internal and market levels, this article studies the
mechanism of goodwill’s impact on the risk of stock price crash at the market level
and company levels based on the information asymmetry hypothesis.
2. Theoretical analysis and hypothesis
Because the stock price crash will have a huge negative impact on the financial mar-
ket and the real economy, scholars have carried out extensive and thorough research
on the mechanism of the risk of stock price crash. As early as the 1980s, scholars
began to theoretically model the risk of stock price collapse. Blanchard and Watson
(1982) found that the price of assets would deviate from the basic value under the
rational behaviour and rational expectation, and a bubble item was derived from the
linear rational expectation model. Therefore, they believed that the stock price bubble
was the reason for the collapse of share price. Campbell and Hentschel (1992) argued
that both bad and good news would increase expected stock price volatility. In order
3386 X. WENWU ET AL.
to compensate for the risk of stock price volatility, investors would demand higher
returns. Good news would lead to upward fluctuations in stock prices, but higher
expected returns would offset some fluctuations. However, when bad news came,
investors would expect higher returns. The degree of influence of share price fluctu-
ation caused by sharp negative news is larger than that caused by positive news, so it
can be inferred that the stock price crash is caused by asymmetric volatility. Later,
some scholars relaxed the condition of complete information, and studied the phe-
nomenon of stock price soaring and plunging from the perspective of information
asymmetry. Based on the information asymmetry hypothesis, Grossman (1988) pro-
posed that the stock market is an incomplete information market, and then explained
the causes of stock price crash from the perspective of information asymmetry by
using incomplete information to build a model. Subsequently, Romer (1993) further
found that the incomplete information in the stock market is mainly internal infor-
mation. Hutton et al. (2009) pointed out that managers tend to conceal ‘bad news’
because of career concerns, job promotion and option exercise. When negative news
accumulates to a limit that cannot be concealed, it will erupt in the external market,
and the company’s share price will be hit so hard that it crashes.
These theories and hypotheses enriched the academic research on the causes of
stock price crash. However, previous studies had shown that the main reason for the
risk of stock price crash was that managers hide bad news from investors and mar-
kets in order to realise their own interests (Kothari et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011).
Under this theoretical framework, scholars mainly studied the risk of stock price
crash from the market level and corporate level. At the company level, Jiang
Hongyun and Wang Xiongyuan (Hongyun & Xiongyuan, 2018) proposed that the
more fully the disclosure of internal supervision information and the higher the qual-
ity of internal control, the lower the risk of stock price collapse. Sun Shuwei et al.
(2017) found that there was a significant positive correlation between executive
reduction and stock price crash risk. Wang Huacheng et al. (2015) found that the
higher the proportion of major shareholders, the stronger the supervisory role of the
company, and the lower the risk of stock price collapse. On the market level, Lin
Yongjian et al. (2018) believed that the higher the liquidity of stock, the greater the
risk of stock price crash. Xu et al. (2013) found that the more external analysts
focused on companies, the greater the risk of stock price crash, the more optimistic
the analysts, the higher the risk.
Goodwill refers to the difference between the acquirer’s merger cost and the fair
value of the identifiable net assets acquired from the acquiree in the merger. The
asset injection behaviour of the major shareholders will not change the goodwill
of the company. Only when the listed company implements the nonrelated market-
oriented M&A will the premium paid be included in the goodwill, so the goodwill is
equal to the premium paid in the market-oriented M&A of the listed company. Few
articles have studied the impact of M&A goodwill on stock price crash under the
mechanism of asymmetric information. According to the provisions of Accounting
Standards for Enterprises No. 20-Merger of Enterprises, in the merger of enterprises
under different control, the difference between the purchaser’s merger cost and the
fair value share of the purchased party’s identifiable net assets obtained in the merger
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shall be recognised as goodwill of merger and acquisition. M&A goodwill, as an intan-
gible asset accompanied by merger and acquisition, has relatively low transparency in
the process of value confirmation. At the corporate level, M&A goodwill is likely to be
manipulated by managers to achieve their own interests. Zhao Yan and Zhao Xiufang
(2016) proposed that the amount of goodwill confirmed in M&A has a significant posi-
tive impact on the improvement of executive compensation after M&A. Masters-Stout
et al. (2008) pointed out that if there is a large-scale impairment of goodwill, the tenure
of senior executives generally does not exceed three years. Because M&A goodwill can
improve company performance, and many company executives’ salaries are linked to
company profits, for the purpose of career and salary, company managers tend to
increase the price of M&A goodwill to ensure their positions and salaries. At the market
level, M&A goodwill may be used by companies to modify current accounting informa-
tion. Zheng Haiying et al. (2014) believed that the company paid higher goodwill could
improve the current company performance, and goodwill cost had a significant negative
correlation with the company performance in the future. This shows that goodwill can-
not continuously improve the company’s performance, so the price of goodwill recorded
on the balance sheet (historical cost) can not reflect its true value, goodwill is likely to
exist as a tool for companies to whitewash accounting information.
The M&A of Chinese listed companies needs a long period of administrative
approval. The repeated and continuous ‘fermentation’ of M&A favourable informa-
tion easily pushes up the stock price. Investors are prone to overreact to M&A, which
is a major event in improving the company’s fundamentals. At the same time, the
longer administrative approval process and the restricted circulation of new shares in
the lock up period create favourable conditions for the rise in stock prices, which
makes the stock price easy to generate bubbles. The result is that investors will over-
react to M&A, which will lead to bubbles and collapse of share prices. Therefore, this
article argues that the confirmation of M&A goodwill exists in information asym-
metry at both corporate and market levels, and information asymmetry will make the
stock price deviate from its basic value. When the negative news caused by informa-
tion asymmetry breaks out in the market, it will trigger the stock price crash. Based
on the above research, we propose hypotheses H1 and H2:
Hypothesis H1: Companies that generate goodwill are more likely to exacerbate the risk
of future stock price crashes than companies that do not generate goodwill.
Hypothesis H2: Goodwill adjusted by net profit is positively correlated with future stock
price crash risk.
In order to explain the impact of goodwill on stock price collapse on the basis of
information asymmetry, this article argues that at the corporate level, information
opacity can effectively capture the traces of corporate earnings manipulated by cor-
porate management through huge goodwill mergers for their own interests. Fu Chao,
et al. (2016) found that the goodwill of some listed companies has the problem of
accounting information quality, and further pointed out that goodwill may become a
tool for corporate executives to manipulate earnings. Therefore, this article defines
the absolute value of manoeuvrable accruals as information opacity to reflect the
behaviour of corporate management in controlling the scale of mergers and acquisi-
tions goodwill. On the market level, the amount of bad news disclosed by the media
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reflects the degree of information asymmetry between companies and investors. The
more negative news the media has, the more widely the company’s information
whitewash is known by the market and investors. On the contrary, the less negative
news the media has, the less supervision the media has on the company, the more
covert the company’s behaviour of tampering with accounting information. The
degree of information asymmetry between companies and investors is higher, which
is more likely to trigger stock price crashes. Regarding the role of the media in the
stock price crash, Luo Jinhui and Du Xingqiang (Jinhui & Xingqiang, 2014) argued
that compared with enterprises with high media attention, enterprises with less media
attention have a higher degree of information asymmetry and a more significant risk
of stock price crashes. Therefore, this article defines the amount of bad news dis-
closed by the media as negative media reports to reflect the degree of information
asymmetry between the company and the market. According to the representation of
asymmetric information usage mechanism at the corporate and market levels, hypoth-
eses H3 and H4 are proposed in this article.
Hypothesis H3: The more opaque the company’s information and the more room for
management to manipulate earnings, the more positive impact of GW on the risk of
future stock price crash.
Hypothesis H4: The less negative media coverage and the less media supervision over
companies, the more positive impact of GW on future stock price crash risk.
3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
Goodwill officially appeared in corporate statements in 2007 as a separate subject.
However, due to the small scale of goodwill in 2007, goodwill was included in the
balance sheet gradually and normalised after 2008. Therefore, this article takes
A-share listed companies in 2008–2016 as the research object. Based on the existing
literature (Xuanyu & Nianxing, 2015; Kangtao et al., 2015), this article excludes the
following samples: (1) Regulated financial companies, as well as companies whose
stocks are specially processed; (2) Companies that have withdrawn from the market;
(3) Samples with less than 30 trading weeks per year so as to avoid the impact of too
few trading weeks on the estimation of stock price crash risk; and (4) Data missing
samples. The annual sample of 17,142 listed companies was obtained. This article
uses the command winsor2 to tail the continuous variables on both sides of this art-
icle at the 1% level. In addition, We cluster the regression criteria at the corporate
level to ensure that the regression results are unbiased. The relevant data in this art-
icle are from Cathay Tai’an database, Wind database and Baidu News.
3.2. Variable definition
3.2.1. Stock price crash risk
Referring to Hutton et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2011), this article uses two indicators to
measure the risk of stock price crash. The specific process is as follows:
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Firstly, in model (1), the weekly return of stock i was regressed by market rate of
return.
Ri, t ¼ ai þ b1Rm, t2 þ b2Rm, t1 þ b3Rm, t þ b4Rm, tþ1 þ b5Rm, tþ2 þ ei, t (1)
Among them, Ri, t is the weekly rate of return of stock i, Rm,t is the A-share mar-
ket yield rate considering the cash income, ei, t is the residual of regression result of
model 1, which is the part of the stock return that cannot be explained by the mar-
ket. If this part is negative, it means that stock i is falling when it is affected by fac-
tors other than the market. Therefore, if ei,t is negative, and the absolute value
is larger, it means that the company’s stock price has a larger decline due to non-
market reasons, and the more likely it is to cause the stock price collapse risk. In
order to achieve the normal distribution of e, we use the formula Wi, t¼ ln(1þ ei,t)
to adjust ei,t to obtain the trait yield Wi,t.
The first indicator of negative income skewness coefficient NCSKEWi, t is calcu-
lated as:









In model 2, n is the number of trading weeks of stock i in year t. The larger the
value of this indicator, the higher the risk of stock price collapse.
The second indicator yield is the upper and lower volatility ratio DUVOLi, t,
which is calculated as:











Among them, nu (nd) is the number of weeks in which the weekly return of stock
i is higher (lower than) the average of the current year’s return. The greater the
DUVOLi, t, the higher the risk of stock price collapse.
3.2.2. Goodwill
(1) This article uses the dummy variable (GW_dum) to divide the observation into a
goodwill group and a non-goodwill group. When generating goodwill, the dummy
variable is 1, otherwise it is 0.
(2) This article selects the GW adjusted by net profit as the explanatory variable. We
use the GW of the company’s t-year balance sheet minus the GW recorded in the com-
pany’s t-1 year balance sheet to get the increment value of goodwill. The incremental
value is then divided by the company’s net profit for the t-year to get the GW.
There are three reasons for the design of the explanatory variables: Firstly, the GW
adjusted by the net profit can effectively show the increment value of goodwill every
year to determine whether the merger or acquisition of the company occurs. Secondly,
according to the research of Zheng Haiying et al. (2014), goodwill is positively corre-
lated with the company’s performance. The greater the GW, the smaller the ability of
goodwill to improve the performance of the current year, which shows that the
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goodwill price does not match its true value, and there are traces of human manipula-
tion. Thirdly, the GW adjusted by net profit can effectively control the interference of
the company’s net profit on the scale of goodwill.
3.2.3. Information asymmetry
(1) This article uses information opacity AbsACC as a variable to measure the degree
of information asymmetry of listed companies at the company level, that is, the abso-
lute value of manipulated accruals obtained according to the Jones model. The greater
the value of AbsACC, the lower the transparency of the company’s information. Here
is the formula used to calculate AbsACC:
TAt=At1 ¼ a1 1=At1ð Þ þ a2ðDSt=At1Þ þ a3ðPPEt=At1Þ þ e (4)
NDAt ¼ a1 1=At1ð Þ þ a2ðDSt  DRtÞ=At1 þ a3ðPPEt=At1Þ (5)
DAt ¼ TAt=At1  NDAt (6)
AbsACC ¼ absðDAtÞ (7)
Firstly, the model (4) is used to control the year and the industry to perform
regression, and the coefficients a1, a2, and a3 are obtained. Secondly, the coefficient
is substituted into the model (5) to calculate NDAt. Then, DAt is calculated using the
data obtained by the models (4) and (5) in the model (6). Finally, the absolute value
of DAt is obtained, and the information opacity AbsACC is obtained.
Among them, TAt is the total accrual item of the company in this year, which is the
difference between net profit and operating cash flow; At-1 is the total assets of the
company in the previous year; NDAt is the non-manipulated accrued surplus of
the company this year; DSt is the company’s non-manipulated accrued surplus for the
current year; DRt is the increment of accounts receivable of the company in the current
year and the previous year; PPEt is the fixed assets of the company for the current
year; DAt is the operational accrued surplus of the company for the current year.
(2) Media negative reports (Badnewst) refers to the number of bad news of a com-
pany disclosed by the media in the t-th year. This article uses Badnewst as a variable
to measure the degree of information asymmetry of listed companies at the market
level. The smaller the number of Badnewst, the higher the information asymmetry of
the company. The source of this variable is Baidu News. We use the name of the
listed company as the keyword, search the full text of the article in Baidu News, and
find the negative news number by searching the topic and keywords, that is, the
number of negative messages on the company i in the t-year.
3.2.4. Control variables
See Chen et al. (2001), Hutton et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2011) and Wang Huacheng
et al. (2015) for related research. This article selects the company size, Tobin Q value,
total return on assets, asset-liability ratio, monthly average excess turnover rate,
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annual average of trait yield, and annual standard deviation of trait yield as control
variables . In addition, this article also controls the year and industry (Table 1).
3.3. Test model
3.3.1. Test model for Hypothesis 1
The study assumes that the test model for H1 is as in model (8). NTSKEW and
DUVOL of tþ 1 years respectively measure the future collapse risk of the company’s
stock price, Crashi, tþ 1; GW_dum is the dummy variable of whether the company
generates goodwill this year; Year and Industry are dummy variables.
Crashi, tþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1GWdumi, t þ cControlVariablest þ Yearþ Industry þ e (8)
3.3.2. Test model for Hypothesis 2
This article uses model (9) to analyse the goodwill on the risk of stock price collapse,
where GW is the goodwill adjusted by net profit.
Table 1. Definition and measurement of variables.
　 Variable symbol Variable name and measurement method
Dependent
Variables
NCSKEWtþ1 The Skewness Coefficient of Negative Stock Return in tþ 1 Year to Measure
the Risk of Stock Market Crashes.
DUVOLtþ1 The fluctuation ratio of the company’s stock return in T þ 1 year to measure
the risk of stock price crashes.
Independent
Variables
GW_dumt Dummy variable, when the sample produces goodwill in the t-year, the
dummy variable is 1, otherwise 0.
GWt The adjusted value of goodwill in the year t, calculated as (the GW on the
balance sheet of this year – the GW on the balance sheet of last year)/
the total assets of this year.
AbsACCt The absolute value of accruals can be manipulated by the company in year
t, which is calculated according to Jones model.
Badnewst The number of bad news about a company disclosed by the media in year t
comes from Baidu News.
Control
Variables
Sizet The size of the company in year t, equal to the natural logarithm value of
the total assets of the company.
TobinQt Tobin Q value in year t, equal to the company’s market value/asset
replacement cost.
ROAt Total Return On Asset in Year t
Levt Asset-liability ratio in year t
Turnt Trend-adjusted stock turnover rate in year t, equal to the average monthly
turnover rate in this year – the average monthly turnover rate in the
previous year.
Rett The annual average of idiosyncratic rate of return in year t.
Sigmat The annual S.D of idiosyncratic rate of return in year t.
Year Dummy variable, when the sample belongs to a certain year, the dummy
variable takes 1, otherwise takes 0. The sample span of this article is
eight years, with 2008 as the base period, a total of seven annual virtual
variables annual factors are introduced to control the factors.
Industry Dummy variable, when the sample belongs to a certain industry, the virtual
variable takes 1, otherwise takes 0. According to the Guidelines for
Classification of Listed Companies in 2001, 17 industries were obtained
after excluding insurance and financial industries. Therefore, 16 industry
virtual variables were introduced to control industry factors.
Source: The Authors.
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Crashi, tþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1GWi, t þ cControlVariablest þ Yearþ Industry þ e (9)
This article uses the model (10) to test whether there is a nonlinear relationship
between the goodwill and the stock price crash risk.
Crashi, tþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1GWi, tP1 þ b2GWi, tP2 þ b3GWi, tP3 þ b4GWi, tP4
þ cControlVariablest þ Yearþ Industry þ e (10)
P1–P5 divides the observations with goodwill greater than 0 from small to large
into five dummy variables generated by quintiles.
3.3.3. Test model for Hypothesis 3
In order to test whether information asymmetry is the mechanism of goodwill’s risk of
stock price collapse, and analyse the influence of information opacity on the relation-
ship between goodwill and stock price collapse, this article adds the intersection term
GWAbsACC to obtain model (11). According to the hypothesis H3, the coefficient
of the intersection term GWAbsACC should be significantly positive, and the coeffi-
cient of the two measures of the goodwill GW and the stock price crash risk should
still be significantly positive, indicating that the higher the information opacity, the
more significant the positive correlation between goodwill and stock price collapse risk.
Crashi, tþ1 ¼ b0 þ GWi, t þ b2GWi, tAbsACCt þ cControlVariablest þ Year
þ Industry þ e (11)
3.3.4. Test model for Hypothesis 4
In order to test whether information asymmetry is the mechanism of goodwill to
aggravate the risk of stock price collapse, and analyse the influence of negative media
reports on the relationship between goodwill and stock price collapse, this article
adds the intersection term GWBadnews to model (12). According to the hypothesis
H3, the coefficient of the intersection term GWBadnews should be significantly
negative, but the coefficient of the two measures of GW and stock price collapse risk
should still be significantly positive; This means that the fewer negative media
reports, the stronger the positive impact of goodwill on the stock price crash risk.
Crashi, tþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1GWi, t þ b2GWi, tBadnewst þ cControlVariablest þ Year
þ Industry þ e (12)
4. Empirical research results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistical results of the main variables studied in this
article. The results show that the mean values of NCKSEWt þ 1 and DUVOLt þ 1
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are 0.2559 and 0.1658, the median values are 0.2148 and 0.1577, and the
standard deviations are 0.6815 and 0.4715 respectively. This indicates that there is a
large difference between the two indicators, and the distribution is left-sided. The
mean value of goodwill is 0.1809 greater than the median value (0.0000), the max-
imum value is 6.8301, and the minimum value is 0.3621. It represents goodwill
with strong right bias, and the difference of GW between companies has increased.
The standard deviation of GW_dum is 0.4264. The degree of goodwill produced by
listed companies varies greatly. The maximum value of Badnews is 294 and the min-
imum value is 2. There are obvious differences in the negative reports of the media
on each company. The standard deviation of AbsACC is 0.0863, and the maximum
and minimum values are 0.5183 and 0.0009. The difference of information opacity
between listed companies is not obvious.
4.2. Statistical analysis of correlation
Table 3 analyses Pearson correlation coefficients of the main variables. The correl-
ation between dependent variables NCKSEWt þ 1 and DUVOLt þ 1 is 0.88, which
is a very significant positive correlation, representing the strong consistency of the
two variables. The correlation coefficients between goodwill (GW_dum) and the two
dependent variables are 0.041 and 0.031, respectively, which are significantly positive
at the level of 1%. In addition, the correlation between goodwill and the two depend-
ent variables is significantly positive at the level of 1%. The correlation is 0.043 and
0.040, which preliminarily proves H1 and H2. As for the relationship between infor-
mation asymmetry index and dependent variable, AbsACC and dependent variables
are not significant, but Badnews and two dependent variables are significantly posi-
tively correlated at the level of 1%.
4.3. Univariate analysis
Before regression analysis, we did univariate analysis of the main variables. According
to whether the sample company produces goodwill this year, we divide the total sam-
ple into sub-samples of goodwill this year (hereinafter referred to as goodwill) and
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables.
Variable symbol Sample size Mean Median S.D Min Max
NCSKEWtþ1 17142 0.2559 0.2148 0.6815 2.3310 1.5052
DUVOLtþ1 17142 0.1658 0.1577 0.4715 1.3320 0.9927
GWt 17142 0.1809 0.0000 0.8797 0. 3621 6.8301
GW_dumt 17142 0.2388 0.0000 0.4264 0.0000 1.0000
Badnewst 17142 44.0615 24.0000 55.4792 2.0000 294.0000
AbsACCt 17142 0. 0749 0.0435 0.0863 0.0009 0.5183
Sizet 17142 21.9722 21.7919 1.2760 19.4517 25.8784
TobinQt 17142 2.6784 2.0472 1.9377 0.9111 11.8096
ROAt 17142 0.0451 0.0398 0.0558 0.1573 0.2235
Levt 17142 0.4446 0.4419 0.2162 0.0478 0.9458
Turnt 17142 0.0054 0.0282 0.4646 1.0901 1.7232
Rett 17142 0.0015 0.0011 0.0013 0.0076 0.0002
Sigmat 17142 0.0511 0.0474 0.0200 0.0186 0.1229
Source: The Authors.
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sub-samples of non-goodwill this year (hereinafter referred to as non-goodwill).
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics and their difference tests for the relevant variables
under sample grouping.
By comparing the two groups of samples, we draw four conclusions: (1) The
negative return skewness coefficient NCSKEWt þ 1 and the fluctuation ratio
DUVOLt þ 1 of return are higher in the goodwill group than in the non-goodwill
group, indicating that the stock price collapse risk of the goodwill sub-sample is
higher in this year; (2) The number of bad news in the goodwill group is higher
than that in the non-goodwill group, which indicates that the media tends to dis-
close more bad news to the companies that produce goodwill in M&A; and (3) The
company size, Tobin Q value and total asset return of the goodwill group are sig-
nificantly higher than that of the non-goodwill group, indicating that M&A good-
will mostly occurs in the companies with larger scale, overvalued market value and
better profitability. The difference test results provide preliminary support for
hypothesis H1.
4.4. Regression analysis
4.4.1. Verify Hypothesis H1
Table 5 shows the regression results between goodwill and the risk of stock price
crash. The results of regression (1) and (3) show that the coefficients of GW_dum
and NCSKEWt þ 1 and DUVOL tþ 1 are 0.0466 and 0.0164 respectively, and there
is a significant positive correlation between GW_dum and NCSKEWt þ 1 and
DUVOL tþ 1 at 5% and 10% levels. After adding control variables, the regression
coefficients of (2) and (4) were 0.0559 and 0.0270 respectively, with significant posi-
tive correlation at 1% and 5% levels. Compared with regression (1) and (3), the sig-
nificance was improved. The above results are consistent with hypothesis H1.
4.4.2. Verify Hypothesis H2
The results of Table 6 show that goodwill in regression (1–4) is positively correlated
with NCKSEWt þ 1 and DUVOLt þ 1 at 1% level, with coefficients of 0.0226,
0.0214, 0.0120 and 0.0123 respectively. The significance of goodwill GW to
Table 4. Difference test.
　
Non-goodwill (1) Goodwill (2)
Difference test (2)–(1)
Variables N Mean N Mean T
NCSKEWtþ1 13048 0.272 4094 0.206 0.066
DUVOLtþ1 13048 0.174 4094 0.140 0.034
GWt 13048 0.000 4094 0.758 0.758
Badnewst 13048 42.876 4094 47.839 4.963
AbsACCt 13048 0.070 4094 0.067 0.003
Sizet 13048 21.892 4094 22.228 0.336
TobinQt 13048 2.647 4094 2.778 0.131
ROAt 13048 0.043 4094 0.051 0.008
Levt 13048 0.448 4094 0.435 0.013
Turnovert 13048 0.002 4094 0.015 0.013
Rett 13048 0.001 4094 0.002 0.001
Sigmat 13048 0.050 4094 0.054 0.004
Source: The Authors.
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NCKSEWt þ 1 is stronger than that of DUVOLt þ 1, but different from regression
(2) t value decreases after adding control variables, and regression (4) which explains
the relationship between goodwill GW and DUVOLt þ 1 increases significantly after
Table 5. The regression result of goodwill and stock price crash risk.
Variable
NCSKEWt þ 1 DUVOLt þ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GW_dumt 0.0466 0.0559 0.0164 0.0270
(3.89) (5.31) (2.17) (3.93)
Sizet 　 0.0356 　 0.0361
　 (9.11) 　 (9.07)
TobinQt 　 0.0249 　 0.0135
　 (9.36) 　 (7.49)
ROAt 　 0.578 　 0.379
　 (6.18) 　 (4.64)
Levt 　 0.0271 　 0.0259
　 (0.67) 　 (0.71)
Turnovert 　 0.0362 　 0.0109
　 (5.10) 　 (1.58)
Rett 　 96.51 　 69.63
　 (5.74) 　 (9.93)
Sigmat 　 7.730 　 5.201
　 　 (7.33) 　 (11.00)
_cons 0.413 0.0159 0.339 0.208
　 (13.48) (0.18) (16.41) (2.30)
year&ind control control control control
Cluster control control control control
N 17142 17142 17142 17142
adj. R sq 0.056 0.079 0.063 0.088
Source: The Authors.
Table 6. The regression result of goodwill value and stock price crash risk.
Variable
NCSKEWt þ 1 DUVOLt þ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GWt 0.0226 0.0214 0.0120 0.0123
(6.98) (6.57) (4.81) (4.92)
Sizet 　 0.0315 　 0.0338
　 (8.87) 　 (9.01)
TobinQt 　 0.0263 　 0.0147
　 (10.29) 　 (8.49)
ROAt 　 0.554 　 0.353
　 (5.71) 　 (4.25)
Levt 　 0.0316 　 0.0293
　 (0.77) 　 (0.82)
Turnt 　 0.0383 　 0.0127
　 (5.60) 　 (2.00)
Rett 　 98.02 　 69.55
　 (6.14) 　 (10.50)
Sigmat 　 7.876 　 5.244
　 　 (7.58) 　 (11.04)
_cons 0.398 0.0961 0.330 0.162
　 (14.04) (1.17) (17.63) (1.94)
year&ind control control control control
Cluster control control control control
N 17142 17142 17142 17142
adj. R-sq 0.0578 0.0799 0.0644 0.0892
Source: The Authors.
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adding control variables. Therefore, we can find that the results of regression (1) 
(4) are consistent with the hypothesis H2, and the results are very significant.
The results in Table 6 show that there is a significant positive correlation between
GW and stock price crash risk. However, in this article, we find the relationship
between GW and management position and annual salary in M&A. Management is
motivated to improve performance and realise their own interests by raising the price of
goodwill in M&A. We speculate that when goodwill is higher than a critical point, the
price of goodwill includes the part manipulated by management, which leads to the risk
of stock price collapse. Therefore, 3153 observations of goodwill GW greater than 0
adjusted by net profit are selected and divided into five groups from small to large. Five
virtual variables P1–P5 are formed. The values of P1–P5 are 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
When the GW of the observed value falls within the range set by the dummy variable,
the dummy variable takes one of 1–5, otherwise it takes 0. Then, we use GW and these
five dummy variables to compose cross-multiplier, and then use the cross-multiplier to
make a regression analysis with the two indicators of stock price crash risk.
Table 7 validates whether goodwill can cause stock price crash risk when it is
above a critical point. Regression (1–4) shows that the multiplier between P5 and
goodwill GW (P5  GW) are significantly positive with the risk of stock price crash
at the level of 1%, while the regression results of the multiplier of P1–P4 between
Table 7. Nonlinear relationship between goodwill value and stock price crash risk.
Variable
NCSKEWt þ 1 DUVOLt þ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P1GWt 2.101 4.063 0.990 0.275
(0.73) (1.45) (0.51) (0.14)
P2GWt 1.082 1.039 0.504 0.460
(1.47) (1.44) (1.07) (1.02)
P3GWt 0.370 0.319 0.210 0.164
(2.65) (2.45) (1.86) (1.67)
P4GWt 0.0612 0.0307 0.0283 0.00794
(2.34) (1.04) (1.29) (0.34)
P5GWt 0.0214 0.0179 0.0154 0.0139
(4.15) (3.67) (4.54) (4.73)
Sizet 　 0.0703 　 0.0601
　 (6.60) 　 (8.47)
TobinQt 　 0.0259 　 0.0122
　 (2.83) 　 (2.65)
ROAt 　 0.640 　 0.357
　 (2.59) 　 (1.82)
Levt 　 0.0337 　 0.00936
　 (0.43) 　 (0.20)
Turnt 　 0.0582 　 0.0177
　 (2.72) 　 (0.63)
Rett 　 43.17 　 48.94
　 (1.28) 　 (2.51)
Sigmat 　 3.751 　 3.031
　 　 (1.57) 　 (1.97)
_cons 0.521 0.755 0.405 0.752
　 (6.07) (2.60) (7.42) (4.26)
year&ind control control control control
Cluster control control control control
N 3153 3153 3153 3153
adj. R sq 0.0613 0.0938 0.0690 0.1010
Source: The Authors.
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goodwill GW (P1–P4  GW) are only sporadic and significant with the risk of stock
price crash, and the results are not obvious. Therefore, when GW is higher than a
certain threshold value, it is possible for management to manipulate earnings through
mergers and acquisitions of goodwill to realise their own interests. The information
asymmetry between enterprises and external investors is higher, which is more likely
to cause stock price crash.
4.5. Mechanism analysis-information asymmetry theory
Although the previous analysis supports H2, the underlying mechanism has not yet
been verified. Based on the theory of information asymmetry, H3 and H4 analyse the
mechanism of goodwill aggravating the risk of stock price crash from the corporate
and market levels. According to relevant research and analysis, we infer that the
higher the degree of information asymmetry, the more significant the positive correl-
ation between goodwill and stock price crash risk. In order to verify the above specu-
lation, at the corporate level, AbsACC is used as an indicator of information
asymmetry; at the market level, Badnews is used as an indicator of information asym-
metry. Information opacity AbsACC corresponds to the extent to which management
conceals negative information. The greater the value of AbsACC is, the more bad
news managers conceal from investors, which means the more serious the informa-
tion asymmetry is. Negative media reports correspond to the supervision role of the
media on listed companies. The less negative media coverage of Badnews, the less
effective it represents the role of media supervision, and the less the market under-
stands the bad news of the company. The more false accounting information, the
higher the degree of information asymmetry. Therefore, we will use GW  AbsACC,
the multiplier of goodwill and information opacity, and GW  Badnews, the multi-
plier of goodwill and negative media reports, to carry out regression analysis with
two indicators measuring the risk of stock price crash respectively, and jointly explain
the mechanism of information asymmetry to aggravate the risk of stock price crash.
4.5.1. Corporate level: information opacity to verify Hypothesis H3
From the perspective of information opacity, Jin and Myers (2006) found that compa-
nies with low information transparency were more likely to hide negative information
and trigger stock price crash. Because the valuation of M&A goodwill involves R&D
projects and asset investment, these M&A information cannot be fully disclosed; and
the higher the value of M&A goodwill, it gives managers more room to manipulate
earnings and hide bad news. Therefore, we predict that information opacity can
aggravate the impact of goodwill on the risk of stock price crash.
Table 8 shows the results of regression analysis of the multiplier (GW  AbsACC)
and the risk of stock price crash. The coefficients of GW in regression (1–4) were
0.0153, 0.0132, 0.0760 and 0.0893 respectively, which were significantly positive at 5%
and 10% levels. More importantly, GWAbsACC and NCSKEWt þ 1 were positively
correlated at 1% level in regression (1) and (2), although the coefficients of
GWAbsACC and DUL decreased significantly, the conclusions of regression (1) and
(2) remained unchanged. This shows that the higher the opacity of information, the
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more significant the positive correlation between goodwill and stock price crash risk.
This result is consistent with hypothesis H3. Therefore, we can conclude that at the
corporate level, information asymmetry theory can effectively explain why goodwill
aggravates the risk of stock price crashes.
4.5.2. Market level: media negative reporting to verify Hypothesis H4
Zhang Feng and Xie Jing (2016) proposed that the media as an intermediary of infor-
mation dissemination would cause synchronous fluctuations in stock prices. Luo
Jinhui and Du Xingqiang (Jinhui & Xingqiang, 2014) further pointed out that media
coverage of listed companies can significantly reduce the risk of stock price crash.
The emergence of negative media reports represents the internal information of the
company transmitted to the market. The situation of information asymmetry is
reversed. The more information investors get, the closer the stock price is to its basic
economic value. Therefore, we speculate that the degree of information asymmetry is
relatively high when the media pay less attention to the company and few bad news
is known by the market. Lack of negative media coverage will aggravate the impact of
goodwill on the risk of stock price crash.
Table 9 shows the results of regression analysis between GW  Badnews and the
risk of stock price crash. In regression (1) and (2), GW and NCSKEWt þ 1 were sig-
nificantly positive at 1% level, and the corresponding coefficients of GWBadnews
were 0.000139 and 0.000656 respectively, which were negatively correlated with
NCSKEWt þ 1 at 1% level. In addition, we found that GW and DUVOLt þ 1 in
regression (3) and (4) were still positively correlated at 5% level, and the correspond-
ing GWBadnews coefficients were 0.000780 and 0.000323 respectively, which
Table 8. Information asymmetry hypothesis: information opacity.
Variable
NCSKEWt þ 1 DUVOLt þ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GWt 0.0153 0.0132 0.00549 0.00507
(3.03) (2.62) (2.24) (1.97)
GWtAbsACCt 0.0840 0.101 0.0760 0.0893
(3.62) (3.50) (2.83) (2.04)
Sizet 　 0.0320 　 0.0342
　 (9.46) 　 (9.46)
TobinQt 　 0.0260 　 0.0144
　 (9.25) 　 (8.51)
ROAt 　 0.561 　 0.362
　 (6.13) 　 (4.53)
Levt 　 0.0299 　 0.0273
　 (0.73) 　 (0.76)
Turnt 　 0.0378 　 0.0122
　 (5.32) 　 (1.90)
Rett 　 98.85 　 70.77
　 (6.16) 　 (10.70)
Sigmat 　 7.954 　 5.323
　 　 (7.58) 　 (11.39)
_cons 0.404 0.0856 0.334 0.171
　 (15.14) (1.10) (19.32) (2.12)
year&ind control control control control
Cluster control control control control
N 17131 17131 17131 17131
adj. R sq 0.0580 0.0799 0.0648 0.0893
Source: The Authors.
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were significantly negative with DUVOLt þ 1 at 10% level. This proves that the posi-
tive correlation between goodwill and stock price crash risk is more significant with
less negative media coverage, and confirms the hypothesis of H4. Therefore, we can
conclude that information asymmetry theory can effectively influence the impact of
goodwill on the risk of stock price crash at the market level.
4.6. Robustness check
4.6.1. Replacement of variables and model metrics
1. Other Indicators to Measure the Risk of Stock Price Crash
According to the research of Callen and Fang (2015), Wu Xiaohui et al. (2019), we use
the difference between downward and upward frequencies of company stock returns to
balance the stock price risk. When the company’s weekly idiosyncratic yield wi, t is
lower than (above) its average of 3.09 standard deviations, we define this week as the
down-week (up-week). Then, we calculate the the difference of stock returns between
down-week’s and up-week’s within one year, which is expressed in CRASH COUNTt.
The greater the CRASH COUNTt, the greater the probability of price crash. Since
CRASH COUNTt is a discrete variable, we test hypotheses H1–H4 by using ordered
series multiclass logistic regression, and the relevant conclusions are still valid.
2. Other Indicators to Measure Goodwill
Table 9. Asymmetric information hypothesis: negative media reporting.
Variable
NCSKEWt þ 1 DUVOLt þ 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GWt 0.0268 0.0233 0.0144 0.0124
(4.90) (4.26) (2.74) (2.73)
GWt Badnewst 0.000139 0.0000656 0.0000780 0.00000323
(3.42) (3.87) (1.97) (2.46)
Sizet 　 99.29 　 71.31
　 (6.21) 　 (11.02)
TobinQt 　 7.970 　 5.347
　 (7.63) 　 (11.60)
ROAt 　 0.0275 　 0.0303
　 (7.20) 　 (9.50)
Levt 　 0.0268 　 0.0151
　 (8.25) 　 (8.33)
Turnt 　 0.564 　 0.365
　 (6.04) 　 (4.56)
Rett 　 0.0340 　 0.0302
　 (0.82) 　 (0.83)
Sigmat 　 0.0383 　 0.0124
　 　 (5.59) 　 (1.98)
_cons 0.376 0.179 0.310 0.0905
　 (15.31) (2.10) (20.86) (1.35)
year&ind control control control control
Cluster control control control control
N 17131 17131 17131 17131
adj. R sq 0.0598 0.0798 0.0681
Source: The Authors.
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This article uses the adjusted goodwill (the increment of goodwill in this year
except the operating profit in this year) and the adjusted goodwill (the increment of
goodwill in this year except the total assets in this year) to replace the original
adjusted GW, which is adjusted by net profit, to test the hypothesis of H2–H4, and
the relevant conclusions remain unchanged.
4.6.2. Endogenous test
Referring to the existing research (Kangtao et al., 2015), this article uses the mean
value of goodwill of the same industry, the same region and the same property rights
as the tool variable of goodwill, and uses the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method
to test the endogeneity. In terms of relevance, there are similarities in business opera-
tions, local policies and corporate systems of companies of the same industry, region
and property nature, so they are related to the goodwill of the company. In addition,
in terms of endogeneity, there is no literature to prove that the goodwill of other
companies in the same industry, same region and the same property rights will affect
the future stock price crash risk of our company, so the above instrumental variables
are exogenous. Table 10 shows the 2SLS estimation results of goodwill and stock





GWt NCSKEWt þ 1 DUVOLt þ 1
Instrumented GWt 　 0.304 0.184
　 (5.15) (4.60)
Industry-average GW 0.793 　 　
(8.38) 　 　
Province-average GW 0.413 　 　
(3.57) 　 　
Ownership-average GW 0.622 　 　
(9.57) 　 　
Sizet 0.0699 0.0447 0.0410
(8.61) (5.79) (7.86)
TobinQt 0.0403 0.0372 0.0212
(7.63) (8.19) (6.80)
ROAt 0.303 0.663 0.430
(2.90) (6.01) (5.66)
Levt 0.293 0.0731 0.0350
(6.77) (1.87) (1.31)
Turnt 0.150 0.00731 0.0159
(7.57) (0.44) (1.40)
Rett 136.4 137.9 94.60
(3.60) (6.34) (6.51)
Sigmat 1.216 7.318 4.927
　 (0.60) (5.63) (5.68)
AbsACCt 0.498 0.176 0.105
　 (4.99) (5.48) (5.56)
Badnewst 0.000604 0.0000451 0.0000121
　 (5.70) (2.81) (2.92)
_cons 1.916 0.249 0.355
　 (9.39) (1.33) (2.81)
year&ind control control control
Cluster control control control
N 17142 17142 17142
adj. R-sq 0.112 . .
Source: The Authors.
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price crash risk. The first stage results show that the relationship between goodwill
and three instrumental variables is significant at 1% level. The second stage regression
results show that goodwill and tþ 1 year stock price crash risks are still significantly
positively correlated, which is the same as the conclusion of hypothesis H2.
5. Conclusion
Based on the merger goodwill data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed compa-
nies from 2008 to 2016, this article studies the relationship among goodwill, informa-
tion asymmetry and stock price crash risk on the basis of theoretical analysis and
empirical research. The results show that goodwill companies can significantly
increase the risk of future stock price crashes. The GW is positively correlated with
the risk of future stock price crash. Researches on the mechanism show that informa-
tion asymmetry theory effectively affects the relationship between goodwill and stock
price crash risk. That is, when goodwill affects stock price crash risk, the more opa-
que corporate information is and the more likely managers manipulate goodwill to
realise their own interests, the greater the risk of a stock price crash. The less negative
corporate news and the less media supervision, the higher the degree of information
asymmetry between companies and investors, and the more significant the risk of
stock price crash. The above empirical evidence shows that one of the economic con-
sequences of high goodwill M&A is to aggravate the risk of future stock price crash,
but companies can reduce this risk by improving the quality of information disclos-
ure and reducing the degree of information asymmetry.
What needs to be explained is that although this article finds that mergers and
acquisitions will lead to the adverse consequences of share price bubbles and collapse,
this does not mean a complete negation of the role of the M&A market in optimising
the allocation of resources. This article also has some shortcomings. Firstly, the sample
of goodwill impairment is insufficient. Secondly, there are many mechanisms of goodwill
intensifying the risk of stock price collapse, such as the stochastic bubble hypothesis and
the volatility feedback hypothesis. This article studies the mechanism of asymmetric
information hypothesis which provides a further perfect space for future research.
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